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REQUIRING MUTUAL ASSENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: HOW TO
MODIFY WRAP CONTRACTS TO REFLECT CONSUMER’S REALITY
Matt Meinel*
“Mutual manifestation of assent . . . is the touchstone of
contract.” 1 The manifestation of mutual assent has evolved
throughout history to accommodate mass commercialization and
technological change. However, new problems have emerged with
the rise of Internet contracting. Consumers, facing increasing
numbers of inconspicuous and obtuse contract offers, are oblivious
to many of the procedural and substantive rights they forfeit
through their everyday activities. Intention to manifest mutual
assent is increasingly becoming a legal fiction in cyberspace.
Courts usually refer to two well-established types of Internet
contracts, but contracts rarely perfectly fit either definition,
leaving courts stranded somewhere in the middle. This Recent
Development argues that courts unnecessarily emphasize
categorization of wrap contracts in lieu of the real legal issue: the
manifestation of mutual assent. Furthermore, courts should adopt
a presumption against mutual assent for cases where assent is
unclear.
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Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2002).
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I. INTRODUCTION
While criminal law comprises most of the legal screen time in
popular culture, contract law occasionally takes center stage. In the
final season of the popular TV show Parks & Recreation,2 the cast
is outraged to discover that Gryzzl, an all-in-one internet search,
social media, shopping, and phone company, is “data-mining” all
of their personal information for the purpose of “learn[ing]
everything about everyone.”3 Unfortunately, Ben Wyatt, the supernerd city manager in the show, discovers that through a convoluted
series of documents, he signed away the privacy rights of the entire
town to Gryzzl.4 Ron Swanson, who zealously defends his own

2

See generally Parks and Recreation (NBC television broadcast),
http://www.nbc.com/parks-and-recreation.
3
Parks and Recreation: Gryzzlbox (NBC television broadcast Jan. 27, 2015).
4
Id. The relevant clause was located in sub-footnote (only viewable by
magnifying glass) in an appendix to an appendix of amendment 14 to
amendment C of the twenty-seventh update of 500-page user agreement granting
free Wi-Fi to everyone in town.
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privacy, 5 unsympathetically admonishes Ben stating, “If you’re
going to sign a legally binding document, you need to read it
thoroughly.”6 However, Ron changes his opinion upon discovering
his son inadvertently fell under the terms of use because Ron’s
wife had simply used a computer.7 While satirical, this episode
raises an increasingly real-word issue: if Ben and Ron, as diligent
as they are, cannot negotiate or protect their rights with a multibillion dollar Internet company, can anyone?8
The Second Circuit considered this issue in Nicosia v. Amazon,
Inc., 9 where the court took a small step towards protecting
consumers from unknowingly entering into contracts.10 In this case,
the plaintiff, Nicosia, had purchased dietary supplements on
Amazon.com that were subsequently discovered to contain a
substance banned by the FDA.11 The Eastern District of New York
had dismissed Nicosia’s claim against Amazon because of a
mandatory arbitration clause in the Conditions of Use,12 but the
Second Circuit reversed and remanded, questioning whether
Nicosia assented to and therefore was bound by the Conditions of
Use.13
This Recent Development analyzes how courts find mutual
assent in online contracting, specifically arguing that courts should
emphasize mutual assent when the facts lie between the two
traditional Internet contracting frameworks, clickwrap and
browsewrap. In Nicosia, the courts found that Amazon employed a
“hybrid” clickwrap-browsewrap. 14 However, allowing a hybrid
5

Id. In the same episode, Ron stated he refused to carry pictures of his son
“where anyone could see them” lest his son’s privacy be violated.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS,
174 (2013) (“The oppressiveness of wrap contracts has become a joke—
literally.”).
9
834 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2016).
10
Id. at 238; see also infra Section IV.
11
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 226.
12
Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
13
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 237–38.
14
See id. at 236; Nicosia, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 151–52.
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approach to Internet contracting is not consistent with precedent,
further erodes consumer protection, and achieves no practical
benefits. Instead, on remand, the district court should use this
opportunity to apply common law principles and find that a general
presumption against assent exists when the evidence of assent is
ambiguous.
This analysis proceeds in four parts. Part II reviews the
development of wrap contracts and examines the confusion and
problems caused when mutual assent is ambiguous. Part III
critiques the hybridwrap framework, arguing that instead of
focusing on labels such as hybridwrap, browsewrap, or clickwrap,
the court should determine whether the proposed contract satisfied
the elements of mutual assent, notice, and intent to agree. Part IV
discusses the facts, arguments, and holdings of the Nicosia case at
the district and appellate courts. The district court found clear
manifestation of mutual assent through a hybridwrap, but the
Second Circuit held that reasonable minds could disagree about the
manifestation assent. Part V argues that courts should adopt a
presumption against assent in situations similar to Nicosia. Such a
presumption would better reflect core contract doctrine in light of
the factual status of notice in online contracting. A presumption
against assent, supported by precedent, would provide benefits for
courts, businesses, and consumers.
II. WRAP CONTRACTS: FINDING MUTUAL ASSENT IN
CYBERSPACE
This section highlights the origin of wrap contract doctrine and
the challenges courts now face in applying it. First, a review of the
early wrap cases provides context and foundational guidelines for
today. Second, ambiguous assent exemplify the struggles courts
face in applying contract law in online contexts. Third, this section
then concludes by expounding the high-stakes implications of how
courts apply mutual assent doctrine moving forward.
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A. Basic Contract Principles & Early Wrap Cases
A transaction becomes a contract when parties mutually
manifest assent to the terms of the agreement.15 Often referred to as
a “meeting of the minds[,]” 16 a manifestation of mutual assent
requires that two parties agree to exchange promises and usually
takes the form of an offer and an acceptance.17 To accept an offer,
the offeree must be aware that there is an offer and that their action
will be construed as an acceptance. 18 When there is no actual
knowledge of the offer, a consumer may have constructive notice.19
Constructive notice exists in online contract formation when “a
reasonably prudent offeree in these circumstances would have
known of the existence of license terms.”20
The advent of the Internet and e-commerce has required courts
to apply centuries-old common law principles to new mediums, but
the fundamentals of contract law remain unchanged 21 Most

15

See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28 (2d Cir. 2002).
See, e.g., Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y.
2009).
17
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 18, 24, 50 (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
18
See Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2012) (“As a
general principle, an offeree cannot actually assent to an offer unless the offeree
knows of its existence.”); Specht, 306 F.3d at 29–30 (“a consumer’s clicking on
a download button does not communicate assent to contractual terms if the offer
did not make clear to the consumer that clicking on the download button would
signify assent to those terms.”).
19
See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 230 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing
Specht, 306 F.3d at 32). Courts will also use the term “inquiry notice,” which is
synonymous with “constructive notice” for the purposes of this article.
20
Specht, 306 F.3d at 31; see also Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 120 (“an offeree is
still bound by the provision if he or she is on inquiry notice of the term and
assents to it through the conduct that a reasonable person would understand to
constitute assent.”).
21
Register.com Inc., v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004) (“While
new commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new situations, it has
not fundamentally changed the principles of contract.”); see also Woodrow
Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM.U.L. REV. 1635, 1644 n. 64
(2011).
16
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relevantly, online contracts still require mutual assent. 22 By
applying contracts principles and case law, two primary
frameworks of contract formation on the Internet have emerged:
clickwrap and browsewrap.23 In clickwrap agreements, users are
presented with the actual terms of the agreement and are required
to click “I agree” in order to proceed with the transaction. 24
Because the consumer makes a purposeful action to assent after
clear notice of terms, clickwraps “expressly and unambiguously
manifest” assent and are therefore enforceable contracts. 25
Browsewrap agreements, on the other hand, only give notice of
terms through hyperlink and do not require express assent.26 Thus,
the case for mutual assent in browsewrap cases is more tenuous.27
Unlike clickwrap, it is common for a court to hold a browsewrap
agreement unenforceable.28 Nevertheless, if there is constructive or
22

Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“Mutual manifestation of assent . . . is the touchstone of contract.”).
23
See Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y.
2009).
24
See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing
Register.com, 356 F.3d at 402–03, 429); see also KIM, supra note 8, at 39.
25
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 233 (quoting Register.com, 356 F.3d at 429); see also
KIM, supra note 8, at 39; Jessica L. Hubley, Online Consent and the On-Demand
Economy: An Approach for the Millennial Circumstance, 8 HASTINGS SCI. &
TECH. L. J. 1, 36 (2016).
26
KIM, supra note 8, at 41; see also Specht, 306 F.3d at 31–32 (2d Cir. 2002)
(describing what would later be termed “browse-wrap”).
27
See Allison Brehm, Click Here to Accept the Terms of Service, 31 COMM.
LAWYER 4, 4 (2015) (citing Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-05682LHK, 2014 WL 2903752, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014) (“Generally, courts
have declined to enforce browsewrap agreements because the fundamental
element of assent is lacking.”); see also KIM, supra note 8, at 41; Hartzog, supra
note 21, at 1644.
28
See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1178–79 (9th Cir.
2014); see also Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 472
(2006) (“An examination of the cases that have considered browsewraps in the
last five years demonstrates that the courts have been willing to enforce terms of
use against corporations, but have not been willing to do so against
individuals.”). For an early case refusing to enforce an online browsewrap
agreement see Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd, 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980–81 (E.D. Cal.
2000) (finding the terms and conditions hyperlink unidentifiable because it was
“small gray text on a gray background”).
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inquiry notice, courts may still find assent in browsewrap cases.29
Constructive notice “depends heavily on whether the design and
content of that webpage rendered the existence of terms reasonably
conspicuous.”30
In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,31 a foundational
Internet contracting case, the website at issue allowed plaintiffs to
download software without viewing or agreeing to the terms of
use, which contained a mandatory arbitration clause.32 However,
the website had a hyperlink to the terms at the very bottom of the
webpage, far enough below the download button to where the
plaintiffs would have had to scroll down in their web browser to
see the notice.33 The court, in determining whether the plaintiffs
were bound by the terms of use, evaluated whether a “reasonably
prudent offeree in [the] plaintiffs’ position” would have had notice
of the terms prior to downloading.34 Concerned about maintaining
“manifestation of assent . . . [as] the touchstone of contract,”35 the
court asserted that requiring reasonably conspicuous notice of
terms and unambiguous assent was essential for contract validity.36
The court noted that the downloading itself was not sufficient to
form a contract.37 Therefore, because the plaintiffs could download
without viewing the notice, and the notice was invisible unless the
plaintiffs scrolled further than they had reason to, the court held
29

Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177 (“[T]he validity of the browsewrap agreement
turns on whether the website puts a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of
the terms of the contract.”); see also KIM, supra note 8, at 41.
30
Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing
Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177–78).
31
306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
32
Id. at 22–23 (2d Cir. 2002).
33
Id. at 23–24.
34
Id. at 20, 35.
35
Id. at 29 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (AM. LAW
INST. 1981)) (“The conduct of a party is not effective as a manifestation of his
assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to
know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents.”).
36
Id. at 35.
37
Id. at 20, 29–30 (“[C]licking on a . . . button does not communicate assent
to contractual terms if the offer did not make clear to the consumer that clicking
on the . . . button would signify assent to those terms.”).
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that the reasonably prudent offeree would not have notice of the
terms, and thus there was no contract.38 With the holding in Specht,
the Second Circuit laid the foundation for browsewrap and its
general unenforceability.39 But, legal tension continues to grow as
courts and parties find themselves ambiguously in between
enforceable clickwrap agreements on one side and unenforceable
browsewrap claims on the other.
B. The Rise of Hybridwrap Cases
When cases meet the traditional definitions of clickwrap or
browsewrap agreements, the legal analysis regarding contract
formation is straightforward. Courts find clickwrap agreements to
be enforceable contracts and browsewrap agreements to be
unenforceable. Increasingly, however, courts are encountering
cases where a “browsewrap agreement resembles a clickwrap
agreement.”40 This occurs when the user is doing more than just
passively browsing a website without any notice; therefore the use
does not meet the classic browsewrap definition, but it also does
not strictly meet the traditional clickwrap definition. When
confronted with these facts, courts have started looking for a
middle ground in their analysis of these mixed agreements—the
hybridwrap.41 The next two cases are examples of when courts
applied “hybridwrap” analysis but achieved different results.

38

Id. at 20, 30–31.
Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“Where the link to a websites terms of use is buried at the bottom of the page or
tucked away in obscure corners of the website where users are unlikely to see it,
courts have refused to enforce the browsewrap agreement.”); see also KIM,
supra note 8, at 42.
40
Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1176 (“Courts have also been more willing to find the
requisite notice for constructive assent where the browsewrap agreement
resembles a clickwrap agreement—that is, where the user is required to
affirmatively acknowledge the agreement before proceeding with use of the
website.”).
41
See, e.g., Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 151 (E.D.N.Y.
2015).
39
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In Meyer v. Kalanick, 42 the plaintiff allegedly agreed to a
mandatory arbitration clause and class action ban when he created
a rider account with Uber using a smartphone app, but the plaintiff
argued there was insufficient notice that he was agreeing to the
terms.43 On the registration screen requiring the plaintiff to enter
his payment information, there was a “Register” button, and at the
bottom of the screen, there was the following notice: “By creating
an Uber account, you agree to the Terms of Service & Privacy
Policy.”44 The court determined the notice was “barely legible[,]”
and it did not take the user directly to the terms and conditions
even when the link was followed.45 Thus, the court found that
because of the relative obscurity of the Terms of Service statement,
there was not reasonable notice.46
In contrast to Meyer, the court in Fteja v. Facebook found a
valid contract. 47 Facebook sought to transfer the case to the
Northern District of California pursuant to a forum selection clause
found in its Terms of Policy. 48 While creating his Facebook
account, the plaintiff clicked a “Sign Up” button with the
following language directly below it: “By clicking Sign Up, you
are indicating that you have read and agree to the Terms of
Service.”49 The phrase “Terms of Service” was a hyperlink to a
page containing the full terms.50 After reviewing both browsewrap
and clickwrap doctrine, the court determined that the plaintiff had
sufficient notice of the terms and that his click would be construed
as assent to them, thereby binding himself to the forum selection
clause. 51 Because hybridwraps allow companies to have
enforceable contracts without the burdens of clickwrap,
42

15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016).
Id. at 7, 12.
44
Id. at 13–14.
45
Id. at 14–15.
46
Id. at 30–31.
47
Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 839 (S.D.N.Y 2012).
48
Id. at 834.
49
Id. at 834–35.
50
Id. at 835.
51
Id. at 840–41.
43
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hybridwraps are becoming increasingly popular, but they also pose
many concerns.
C. Lowering Mutual Assent Requirements
As wrap contract law continues to develop, several worrisome
trends grow alongside it. When courts rely heavily on constructive
notice to derive mutual assent, it undermines the foundational
theories of contract law.52 Despite the well-known fact that no one
reads53 or understands54 online terms, nor realistically could do so if
they wanted to,55 courts have consistently placed the burden of
reading and understanding terms of use on the consumer by
applying constructive notice liberally.56

52

KIM, supra note 8, at 16. (“The problem with wrap contracts is that they fail
on the level of doctrine[.]”).
53
See generally Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on
the Internet: Ignoring the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of
Social Networking Services, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2757465 (Aug. 24, 2016)
(finding 74% of study participants did not read agreement in which they agreed
to give the company their first-born child).
54
See Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *32–
33 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016) (quoting “Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau Study Finds That Arbitration Agreements Limit Relief for Consumers,”
Consumer
Protection
Financial
Bureau,
Mar.
10,
2015,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-study-finds-thatarbitration-agreements-limit-relief-for-consumers.) (“Over three quarters of
those who said they understood what arbitration is acknowledged they did not
know whether their credit card agreement contained an arbitration clause.
Among consumers whose contract included an arbitration clause, fewer than 7
percent recognized that they could not sue their credit card issuer in court.”).
55
KIM, supra note 8, at 213 (citing Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith
Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4:3 I/S: A J. OF LAW AND POL’Y
540, 562 (2008)) (“One study estimated that it would cost the average American
Internet user 201 hours or the equivalent of $3,534 a year to read the privacy
policies of each website that he or she visits.”).
56
See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“[F]ailure to read a contract before agreeing to its terms does not relieve a party
of its obligations under the contract[.]”).
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This becomes particularly salient when consumers
unknowingly give up important rights.57 Because corporations draft
wrap contracts, they generally contain clauses that favor the
company’s interest over consumers who have very little, if any,
opportunity to negotiate.58 Major difficulties, and much litigation,
arise when consumers agree to binding arbitration by implicitly
agreeing to Conditions of Use and thereby denying courts any
jurisdiction.59 When combined with class action bans, mandatory
arbitration clauses become particularly troublesome for
consumers.60 The purpose of class action is to “allow[] people who
lost small amounts of money to join together to seek relief.”61
However, if the plaintiffs are forced out of court and into
arbitration, they can lose their class action status, and the litigation
is often no longer cost effective for the plaintiff.62
Moreover, although not much information exists on the
arbitration proceedings themselves,63 arbitrators are often biased in
57

See Emily Canis, One “Like” Away: Mandatory Arbitration for Consumers,
26 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 127, 135 (2015) (“[P]eople are frequently at risk of
entering into mandatory arbitration agreements without even knowing it, simply
by interacting on one of these Internet applications.”).
58
See KIM, supra note 8, at 21, 26; Cheryl Preston, Please Note: You Have
Waived Everything: Can Notice Redeem Online Contracts? 64 AM.U.L. REV.
535, 536 (“Wrap contracts are merely the means for powerful contract drafter to
legislate legal results.”); Canis, supra note 57, at 154 (“While [clickwrap and
browsewrap agreements] were initially fair to both companies and consumers,
these concepts have also evolved into a dangerous mechanism where companies
can control consumers’ legal rights without a consumer ever realizing.”).
59
See, e.g., Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 147–48
(E.D.N.Y. 2015).
60
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere,
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015)
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywherestacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=0 (“By banning class actions, companies
have essentially disabled consumer challenges to practices like predatory
lending, wage theft and discrimination[.]”).
61
Id.
62
See id. (“Roughly two-thirds of consumers contesting credit card fraud, fees
or costly loans received no monetary awards in arbitration”).
63
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a
‘Privatization of the Justice System,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015),
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favor of the companies, and there are limited procedural safeguards
in place for consumers.64 Most often, plaintiffs decide not to pursue
their claims, accepting the corporations’ desired outcome.65 While
mandatory arbitration clauses and class action bans have been
struck down as unconscionable,66 the Supreme Court recently, in a
string of cases,67 strengthened the validity of arbitration clauses,68
stating “courts must ‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements
according to their terms[.]”69 The use of arbitration clauses and
class-action bans by corporations has continued to increase. 70
When the rise of arbitration clauses is coupled with a reduction in
consumer negotiating power, the result is consumers involuntarily
giving away their right for their grievances to be heard in a court of
law.71
III. HYBRIDWRAP’S LEGAL UTILITY (OR LACK THEREOF)
While formulating a hybridwrap framework for scenarios “in
between” clickwrap and browsewrap may make intuitive sense,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-aprivatization-of-the-justice-system.html (“Little is known about arbitration
because the proceedings are confidential and the federal government does not
require cases to be reported.”).
64
See id.
65
See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 60.
66
See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011)
(discussing other cases in which mandatory arbitration clauses and class action
bans were struck down).
67
See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304
(2013); CompuCredit Corp v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); AT&T
Mobility, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
68
See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 60 (finding 83% of class
action bans were upheld in 2014); see also Canis, supra note 57, at 144
(discussing how these Supreme Court cases do not favor consumers).
69
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
70
Canis, supra note 57, at 128 (“For many of these clickwrap agreements, it is
quite common for companies to try to include a provision that mandates forced
arbitration.”).
71
See generally Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note at 60 (discussing
the shrinking consumers’ ability to litigate in court due to the rise in mandatory
arbitration clauses).
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hybridwrap fails both doctrinally and practically. Since the
determinative fact in all wrap cases is whether there is a
manifestation of mutual assent, adding another category of
“hybridwrap” is, at best, simply a label acknowledging that the
case is unclear as a matter of law on these facts. In opinions and
briefs, courts and parties already take inordinate amounts of space
to distinguish between the wrap labels instead of focusing on
mutual assent, and creating a hybridwrap fosters this. Hybridwrap
encourages courts to further unmoor contracts from mutual assent
by introducing the binding power of clickwrap into the ambiguity
of browsewrap. Overall, courts should reject hybridwrap
terminology, and focus on manifestation of mutual assent.
A. Despite the Labels, There Is One Test: Manifestation of Mutual
Assent
Before browsewrap or clickwrap even existed, manifestation of
mutual assent formed the basis for all contracts.72 All wrap cases
ultimately are determined by the presence of mutual assent.73 The
presumptive validity of clickwrap agreements does not stem from
the designation of “clickwrap”; rather, whenever a fact pattern
matches the clickwrap paradigm by presenting the terms of
agreement and requiring a purposeful action for assent, those facts
conclusively meet the requirements for a manifestation of mutual

72

Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (1981)) (“Mutual
manifestation of assent . . . is the touchstone of contract.”); see also supra
Section II.A.
73
For example, in Register.com v. Verio, Inc. the Second Circuit unusually
enforced a “browsewrap” agreement because it found mutual assent.
Register.com Inc., v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). The offeree,
Verio, consistently used the offeror’s website, Register.com, for business
purposes in a way that violated the terms of use. Id. at 396–97. After each
business use of the website, Verio received notice of the terms and conditions,
and thus Verio argued that they were not binding because the terms were not
available before the transaction. Id. at 402. The court, however, found that Verio
had sufficient notice because of its continued, regular use after receiving actual
notice of the terms. Id. at 401.
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assent. 74 Similarly, browsewraps are not generally invalid
agreements because of the label; browsewrap fact patterns do “not
require the user to manifest assent to the terms and conditions
expressly.”75 Thus, if a court were to apply hybridwrap, the court
would simply note that the facts do not meet the strict definition of
either clickwrap or browsewrap, and then proceed to conduct the
same search for a manifestation of mutual assent that it would have
regardless.
The Second Circuit perfectly demonstrated this concept in
Nicosia v. Amazon.com. The court noted that while Nicosia argued
only browsewrap principles apply, Amazon and the district court
maintained this was “something in between.”76 The Second Circuit
assumed without deciding that hybridwrap should apply, 77 but
instead of focusing on the specific type of agreement, the court,
relying on precedent, focused on the notice to the reasonably
prudent offeree and manifestations of assent.78 The Second Circuit
had the flexibility to assume without deciding that hybridwrap
applied because that determination was ultimately irrelevant to the
case.79
Nevertheless, the increased acceptance by courts of
browsewraps resembling clickwraps is not contingent upon the
labels themselves. Rather, the more a browsewrap resembles a
clickwrap, the more likely it is to contain the requisite
74

See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir. 2016)
(quoting Register.com, 356 F.3d at 429).
75
Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366–67 (E.D.N.Y.
2009)).
76
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 235.
77
Id. at 236.
78
Id. (citing Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2012))
(“[I]n cases such as this, where the purported assent is largely passive, and the
contract-formation question will often turn on whether a reasonably prudent
offeree would be on inquiry notice of the term at issue.”); see also Nguyen, 763
F.3d at 1177 (“[T]he validity of the browsewrap agreement turns on whether the
website puts a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the
contract.”).
79
See Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 236.
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manifestation of mutual assent through constructive notice that
courts always look for in browsewrap scenarios.80 Ultimately, “all
these labels can take courts only so far,”81 for most cases will fall
somewhere in between browsewrap and clickwrap, requiring factbased inquiries that defy bright-line rules.82 Therefore, regardless
of how a court classifies a fact pattern, the court’s finding will be
determined by the manifestation of assent by the reasonably
prudent offeree. 83 However, courts, and consequently litigating
parties, focus too much on the wrap labels before reaching the
underlying issues.
B. Examples of Overemphasis on Wrap Labels
When analyzing wrap contracts, courts and parties often
rhetorically overemphasize where the facts of the case fall on the
browsewrap/clickwrap spectrum. The Nicosia district court
opinion, and the parties’ briefs on appeal, exemplifies this trend.
The district court decided that Amazon’s terms of use constituted a
hybridwrap because the court assumed consumers automatically

80

See, e.g., id. at 233 (citing Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d
17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002)) (“In determining the validity of browsewrap agreements,
courts often consider whether a website user has actual or constructive notice of
the conditions.”); In re Zappos.com, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063–64 (D. Nev.
2012) (“[T]he determination of the validity of a browsewrap contract depends
on whether the user has actual or constructive knowledge of a website’s terms
and conditions.”).
81
Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *21
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016).
82
Id. at 30.
83
See Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1176–77 (“[W]hether the website puts a
reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract . . .
depends on the design and content of the website and the agreement’s
webpage.”); Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“[T]he contract-formation question will often turn on whether a reasonably
prudent offeree would be on inquiry notice of the term at issue.”); Meyer, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *30 (quoting Specht, 306 F.3d at 35)
(“Consequently, courts must embark on a ‘fact-intensive inquiry,’ in order to
make determination about the existence of ‘[r]reasonably conspicuous notice’ in
any given case”).
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agreed to the terms when they placed their order.84 In doing so, the
court failed to assess whether consumers had sufficient notice that
the clicking of the “Place your order” button would be a
manifestation of assent.
Likewise, appellant Nicosia’s brief demonstrated a
misconception of wrap contract formation. 85 Nicosia repeatedly
and prominently based his argument on whether the court should
apply browsewrap or clickwrap “principles” and “rules,” arguing
that the court should only rely on browsewrap precedent while
clickwrap cases should be excluded from consideration.86 In his
argument, Nicosia spends unnecessary time distinguishing between
clickwrap and browsewrap instead of focusing on the actual
dispositive issue of mutual assent.87 Similarly, Amazon also missed
the point in its appellee brief by overemphasizing the act of
clicking.88 It is not the clicking itself that is important, even in a
clickwrap analysis, but rather the clicking is important to the extent
that it expressly manifests assent.
While the arguments in the party briefs are not important legal
doctrine, they demonstrate the inefficiencies created by overemphasizing labels. The parties waste valuable effort making
legally insignificant distinctions instead of succinctly identifying
and arguing the determinative legal issues, and the courts, as a
84

Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 143, 151 (E.D.N.Y.
2015).
85
See Reply Brief for Appellant at 4–13, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834
F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2016).
86
Brief for Appellant at 26, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220 (2d
Cir. 2016) (“C. The District Court Applied Inapposite Clickwrap Principles.);
Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, 8, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220
(2d Cir. 2016) (“I. AMAZON CANNOT EXPLAIN AWAY THE DISTRICT
COURT’S FAILRUE TO APPLY THIS COURT’S BROWSEWRAP RULES”;
“II. CLICKWRAP PRINCIPLES DO NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE.”).
87
See Brief for Appellant at 16–29, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d
220 (2d Cir. 2016); Reply Brief for Appellant at 4–11, Nicosia v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 834 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2016).
88
See Brief for Appellee at 28, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220
(2d Cir. 2016) (“Plaintiff acknowledged agreement by affirmatively clicking to
proceed with the transaction”).
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result, must waste time wading through irrelevant arguments.
Adopting hybridwrap as a form of contracting continues to fuel
this focus on the including or excluding the correct “type” of legal
precedent and principles instead of focusing on how the facts
actually correspond to finding a manifestation of mutual assent.
C. Ill-Effects of Hybridwrap on Mutual Assent
Hybridwraps present solutions to problems that do not exist
and exacerbate problems that do exist. The browsewrap doctrine is
sufficient to resolve contract formation issues that fall short of full
clickwrap, but attempting to merge clickwrap and browsewrap to
cover ambiguous cases will result in misapplication of the law and
greater inequity toward consumers.
Practically, there is no gap between clickwrap and browsewrap
that hybridwrap needs to fill, because there is no situation where
“clicking” without actual or constructive notice of an offer would
be legally relevant. For example, in Fteja v. Facebook, the
importance of clicking “Sign Up” turned on whether the user
would have constructive notice that clicking would constitute
assent.89 If the user had no notice, then clicking to register would
solely manifest intent to register.90 However, because there was
constructive notice, clicking to register unambiguously manifested
assent.91 In the first scenario, the click is irrelevant; in the second
scenario, the click is dispositive.
Furthermore, while the hybridwrap focus on the action of
clicking should not add anything without proper notice, applying
hybridwrap will confuse and bias courts into considering the click
when the click should not be considered. Fundamentally, the
hybrid approach blurs the line between actions manifesting assent
and factors to be considered for notice. A user cannot manifest
assent without proper notice,92 but allowing the courts to evaluate
89

See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y 2012).
See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 29–30 (2d Cir. 2002).
91
Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 841.
92
Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2012) (“As a
general principle, an offeree cannot actually assent to an offer unless the offeree
knows of its existence.”).
90
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both the assenting act and notice simultaneously, as hybridwrap
does, places the factual cart before the legal horse.93
The ultimate question in wrap contract disputes is whether
there was mutual assent. In clickwrap cases, the “clicking-action”
constitutes an actual manifestation of assent, settling the issue. In a
browsewrap analysis, the click itself does not increase or decrease
the chances that the consumer had notice of the terms and should
not be considered until after notice is established.94 Thus, courts
should continue to only refer to clickwrap and browsewrap fact
patterns. Any cases that fall short of clickwrap should be handled
as browsewrap where the court must find the reasonably prudent
offeree would be put on constructive notice that the terms exist and
an action will constitute assent. Adding another label does not help
courts ascertain the existence of mutual assent.95
Additionally, utilizing hybridwrap exacerbates the existing
concerns about wrap contracts by functionally creating a
presumption in favor of assent, thereby further weighting the scales
against the consumer. 96 The question of whether there is a
hybridwrap arises when there is a browsewrap with a little
something extra—some extra action by the consumer that
distinguishes it from a pure browsewrap case.97 Since companies
seeking to enforce the agreement will over-emphasize the action,98
courts will be tempted to allow the action to bias their finding of
notice.99 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit observed that “[c]ourts have . . .
been more willing to find that requisite notice for constructive
assent where the browsewrap agreement resembles a clickwrap
93

See Specht, 306 F.3d at 29–30.
See id.
95
Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *21–22
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016).
96
See Preston, supra note 58, at 536 (“Wrap contracts are merely the means
for powerful contract drafter to legislate legal results.”).
97
See Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835, 838 (S.D.N.Y 2012).
98
See Brief for Appellee at 20, 28, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d
220 (2d Cir. 2016).
99
See, e.g., Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 151–52
(E.D.N.Y. 2015).
94
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agreement—that is, where the user is required to affirmatively
acknowledge the agreement before proceeding with use of the
website.”100
For the above reasons, this Recent Development will forgo use
of the term “hybridwrap” as much as possible in favor of focusing
on the core contracting terms of mutual assent and notice, and the
district court on remand should do likewise. While browsewrap
and clickwrap frameworks are crucial for defining the spectrum of
mutual assent issues courts face, they should be used only as
guideposts for orientating the court on the continuum of
precedents. However, since most cases fall in the middle ground,
courts should expeditiously move to evaluations of notice and
intent to assent, which are the truly determinative criteria.
Similarly, this Recent Development will continue to utilize the
well-established terms of clickwrap and browsewrap, but the
driving focus will be creating a framework through which to
analyze the middle ground.
IV. NICOSIA V. AMAZON.COM: FACTS AND ARGUMENTS
This section examines the Nicosia case and how the district
court and the Second Circuit differed in their analysis of mutual
assent. After stating the facts and procedural history of the case,
this section looks at what the district court found and why, and
why the Second Circuit found that no enforceable contract existed.
A. Facts & the District Court’s Decision
In 2013, Nicosia purchased weight-loss pills on
Amazon.com. 101 However, these pills contained the chemical
sibutramine, which the FDA withdrew from the market in 2010
because of negative health risks.102 Nicosia filed a class action suit
against Amazon.com claiming violation of the Consumer Product
Safety Act and seeking damages and an injunction against selling
100

Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2014).
Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 226 (2d Cir. 2016).
102
Id. (“[T]he FDA advised physicians to stop prescribing sibutramine and to
advise patients to cease its consumption due to its risks[.]”).
101
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products with sibutramine.103 In district court, Amazon moved to
dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, arguing Amazon’s
Conditions of Use contained a mandatory arbitration clause and a
class action ban.104 Amazon claimed that Nicosia assented to the
Conditions of Use when he made online purchases.105 At the time
of purchase, the checkout screen contained a link to the Conditions
of Use and a statement reading, “By placing your order, you agree
to Amazon.com’s Conditions of Use.”106 The Conditions of Use
included a mandatory arbitration provision and a class action
waiver. 107 Amazon argued that clicking the “Place your order”
button constituted agreement, per the hyperlink notice provided on

103

Id. at 227; see also Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–89
(2012).
104
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 226–27; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
105
Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 151–52 (E.D.N.Y.
2015). Amazon also contended, and the district court agreed, that when setting
up his Amazon account in 2008, Nicosia must have checked a box indicating he
agreed with the Conditions of Use. Id. at 145. However, Nicosia maintained that
he never created an account, never agreed to the 2008 Conditions of Use, and
that Amazon had insufficient proof that he did. Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 227. The
2008 Conditions of Use did not have an arbitration clause, id., but the 2008
Conditions of Use did state that Amazon “reserve[s] the right to make changes
to . . . these Conditions of Use at any time,” Nicosia, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 145. The
district court found that Nicosia must have created an account and took that into
consideration when evaluating the overall mutual assent. Id. at 151–52. The
district court found this provided additional constructive notice to the later
Conditions of Use. Id. But the Second Circuit held that it was improper to
consider the creation of the account under the well-established standard for the
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which requires the court “accept[]
all factual allegations as true, and draw[] all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s
favor.” Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 231–35. While the factual issue of whether Nicosia
did explicitly agree to the Conditions of Use upon creating an account may
ultimately be dispositive in this litigation, this Recent Development will
exclusively focus on the possible mutual assent at the time of purchase.
106
Nicosia, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 146; Brief for Appellee at 7, Nicosia v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2016).
107
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 227 (“Any dispute or claim . . . will be resolved by
binding arbitration, rather than in court . . . . We each agree that any dispute
resolution proceedings will be conducted only on an individual basis and not in
a class . . . action.”).

200

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 18: 180

the purchase page.108 Nicosia, however, argued that the Conditions
of Use were not enforceable because he never intended to assent to
those terms; rather, he simply placed his order.109
On these facts, the Eastern District of New York found there
was a valid contract to arbitrate and thus granted Amazon’s motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.110 When evaluating whether
Nicosia assented to the Conditions of Use, the district court applied
a hybridwrap analysis.111 The district court said that even though
the Conditions of Use were only viewable through hyperlink (like
a browsewrap), the hyperlink was “conspicuous” and thus
provided constructive notice. 112 Since the consumer received
notice, he agreed to the condition by completing the purchase.113
Therefore, the mandatory arbitration clause and the class action
waiver bound Nicosia.114
B. Second Circuit’s Reasoning & Reversal
The Second Circuit found that the district court erred in
granting the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.115 The
court began its analysis by reviewing the pertinent case law
regarding wrap labels, but ultimately the court focused on the
requirements of mutual assent: conspicuous notice and intent to
assent.116 The court determined that the facts in this case did not
conform to either the traditional clickwrap or browsewrap

108

Nicosia, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 150.
Id.
110
Id. at 144.
111
Id. at 151–52 (quoting Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171,
1176–77 (9th Cir. 2014)) (“Courts have . . . been more willing to find that
requisite notice for constructive assent where the browsewrap agreement
resembles a clickwrap agreement—that is, where the user is required to
affirmatively acknowledge the agreement before proceeding with use of the
website.”).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 151–53.
115
Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 234–35, 238 (2d Cir. 2016).
116
Id. at 232–33.
109
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definitions. 117 Thus, “assum[ing] without deciding that the
agreement was a hybrid between a clickwrap and a browsewrap
agreement,” the court proceeded to use the reasonably prudent
offeree test, requiring notice of the Conditions of Use and assent to
those Conditions.118
Thus, the determinative issue before the court was whether
Nicosia had constructive notice of the Conditions of Use.119 On that
issue, the court held that Amazon failed to show that Nicosia was
on notice and that he assented to the Conditions of Use.120 The
court stated that constructive notice “depends heavily on whether
the design and content of that webpage rendered the existence of
terms reasonably conspicuous.”121 Focusing on the facts, the court
first noted that the “critical sentence” was in a smaller font then the
rest of the page.122 Moreover, the court stressed that there were
many items on the page competing for the user’s attention,123 and
117

Id. at 233, 236.
Id. at 236 (citing Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir.
2012)) (“[I]n cases such as this, where the purported assent is largely passive,
and the contract-formation question will often turn on whether a reasonably
prudent offeree would be on inquiry notice of the term at issue.”); see also
Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he
validity of the browsewrap agreement turns on whether the website puts a
reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract.”).
119
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 235.
120
Id. at 237–38.
121
Id. at 233 (citing Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177–78).
122
Id. at 236.
123
Here the court listed the facts that it found legally relevant. Id.
“Turning to the Order Page, we are not convinced that notice was
sufficient as a matter of . . . law . . . . Among other things, users are
shown their shipping address, billing address, and payment method,
and given the option to edit that information or ‘try Amazon Locker.’
Users are also given the opportunity to change the delivery date, enter
gift cards, and promotional codes, and sign up for “FREE Two-Day
Shipping” four times in the center of the page, appearing in orange,
green, and black fonts, and white font against an orange banner . . . .
[A] ‘Place your order’ button above a box with the heading ‘Order
Summary.’ The Order Summary box lists the cost of the items to be
purchased, shipping and handling costs, total price before tax,
estimated tax to be collected, purchase total, gift card amount, and
118
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the notice itself, which was not bold or capitalized, was not
reasonably conspicuous compared to the other distracting elements
on the webpage.124 Therefore, the court concluded that the district
court erred in finding Nicosia had failed to state a claim.125
The Second Circuit did not decide the hybridwrap issue or
whether Nicosia manifested mutual assent. Instead, the court
vacated and remanded the case because “reasonable minds could
disagree on the reasonableness of the notice.” 126 By simply
assuming the validity and existence of a hybridwrap and not
making a holding on the ultimate assent issue, the Second Circuit
left these questions open for discussion at the lower court on
remand. 127 To make a decision regarding the manifestation of
assent in this case, the district court will need to adopt a framework
for analyzing the facts of this case. The next sections lay out what
this framework should be.
V. CREATING A COMMON LAW PRESUMPTION AGAINST ASSENT
Regardless of whether courts reject the hybridwrap label, the
courts must determine how to equitably apply the common law of
contracts to fact patterns with ambiguous mutual assent. Currently,
courts use the reasonably prudent offeree standard to assess
whether there would be notice. Determining who is the “reasonable
person” is impossible to precisely define, as every first-year law
student learned in torts, but in light of well-established facts that no
one does or can read all of the terms and conditions they
encounter, 128 courts should reevaluate the capabilities of the
order total. The words ‘Order total’ appear in bold, red font . . . . Near
the bottom of the page, there are a number of sentences in faint, black
font directing users to links to other Amazon webpages for additional
information, such as tax and seller information, customer assistance
pages, and product returns policies. At the very bottom of the page,
links to the Conditions of Use and Privacy Policy appear again in
blue.”
124
Id. at 236–37.
125
Id. at 226.
126
Id. at 237–38; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
127
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 235–36, 238.
128
Supra Section II.C.
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reasonably prudent offeree to bring wrap contracts more in line
with contract doctrine. 129
A. Defining a Presumption Against Assent
The legal reasonably prudent offeree should move closer to
reality by courts beginning with the rebuttable presumption that
there is no mutual assent. In cases where mutual assent is at issue,
courts should presume that (1) consumers will not have notice of
the terms and conditions, and (2) consumers will not have notice
that their conduct will constitute acceptance of those terms. 130
Adopting these presumptions would require courts to critically
evaluate whether the crucial elements of mutual assent were
satisfied by the facts presented.131
The notice of terms must be conspicuous.132 In Specht, the
inconspicuousness of the terms of agreement was dispositive.133
The website had a hyperlink to the terms at the very bottom of the
webpage, far enough below the download button to where the
plaintiffs would have had to scroll down in their web browser to
see the notice.134 Because there was not “immediate visible notice”
of the terms, the reasonably prudent offeree would not have known
129

See Preston, supra note 58, at 575 (“Courts certainly can, and should,
increase the scrutiny and develop common law standards of fairness in the
online context.”).
130
See Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *31
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016) (“[T]he Uber registration screen . . . did not adequately
call users’ attention to the existence of the Terms of Service, let alone to the fact
that, by registering to use Uber, a user was agreeing to them.”).
131
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“The conduct of a party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless
he intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the
other party may infer form his conduct that he assents.”).
132
Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 31 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“Clarity and conspicuousness of arbitration terms are important in securing
informed consent.”); see also Conspicuous, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014) (“[C]learly visible or obvious. Whether a printed clause is
conspicuous as a matter of law usually depends on the size and style of the
typeface.”).
133
Specht, 306 F.3d at 31.
134
Id. at 23–24.
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about the terms.135 Generally, even if the notice is present on the
consumer’s screen, it may not be conspicuous, for the terms must
stand out based on the website design. 136 When considering
whether the consumer will direct their attention to the notice, the
court should consider what other elements are competing for the
consumer’s limited attention.137 In other words, compared to the
other elements on the webpage, there must be reason to believe
that the notice would garner the attention of the reasonably prudent
offeree. In Nicosia, the Second Circuit observed that the notice of
the Conditions of Use were not “conspicuous in light of the whole
page” because the notice was not bold or capitalized, while the rest
of the page was full of links and advertisements with more
attention-grabbing colors, positions, and fonts.”138
In Meyer, the court evaluated the relative conspicuousness of
the notice by comparing the visual prominence of the Terms of
Service with the other “very user-friendly and obvious” elements
on the screen.139 The court found that the notice on the Uber app
was not “likely to disrupt viewers’ experiences in some way and
draw their attention to the terms and conditions . . . .”140 Although
the terms were listed right under the “Register” button, the notice
was “barely legible” and there was nothing otherwise drawing
attention to the terms.141 Rather, the court concluded that the app
creators designed the visual layout to encourage the consumer to
register without noticing the terms of agreement. 142 Meyers
demonstrates how the presumption against notice would be
applied. Instead of simply relying on the existence of the notice on
135

Id. at 20, 31.
See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176–78 (9th Cir.
2014).
137
See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 237 (2d Cir. 2016).
138
Id. at 236–37.
139
Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *21–22
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016) (quoting Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306
F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002)).
140
Id. at 28–29 (quoting Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 404
(E.D.N.Y 2015)).
141
Id. at *13–15.
142
Id. at *31.
136

DEC 2016] Requiring Mutual Assent in the 21st Century

205

the webpage, the court should compare the relative
conspicuousness of the notice to other elements of the webpage
and require that the notice be as equally conspicuous as other
hyperlinks and ads. If the notice would not reasonably disrupt the
consumer’s attention, the court should find there was no notice.143
Once notice of the terms is established, courts should require
companies to provide evidence of clear and parallel wording
between the written notice and the action taken, which results in
consumers having notice that their conduct will constitute
acceptance of those terms.144 For example, in Fteja v. Facebook,
the court found that the user did have notice that his actions
constituted assent because the notice of terms mentions “By
Signing Up”, and the relevant button said “Sign Up.”145 In contrast,
in Meyer v Kalanick, the found that “the registration screen here
does not contain parallel wording as between the ‘Register’ button
and the statement ‘By creating an Uber account, you agree to the
Terms of Service & Privacy Policy.’” 146 This rule would not
require the same express assent required by clickwrap, but it
ensures that the reasonably prudent offeree can quickly and clearly
understand what actions constitute assent.147
Additionally, courts should suspiciously view any supposed
actions manifesting assent that the consumer would have made
regardless of whether he actually intended to assent. For example,
a consumer on Amazon.com would click the “Place your order”
button independent of any intent to consent to the terms.148 When a
143

See id. at *28–29.
Id. at *30 (citing Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 373–74
(E.D.N.Y 2015)).
145
Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834–35 (S.D.N.Y 2012).
146
Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *30 (citing Berkson, 97 F. Supp.
3d at 373–374).
147
See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 236 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing
Register.com Inc., v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 402–03, 429, n.41 (2d Cir.
2004)) (“Notably, unlike typical ‘clickwrap’ agreements, clicking ‘Place your
order’ does not specifically manifest assent to the additional terms, for the
purchaser is not specifically asked whether she agrees or to say ‘I agree.’”).
148
See Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 236–37 (citing Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 835, 840)
(“Nothing about the ‘Place your order’ button alone suggests that additional
144
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button or action serves the dual purpose of manifesting assent and
furthering a different objective, there is a greater risk that the
consumer exclusively intended the non-assenting result.149 Thus,
courts should presume that the consumer solely intended to
achieve the other objective unless there is clear notice and parallel
wording. But, as occurred in Facebook v. Fteja, if the notice is
relatively conspicuous and clearly indicates that the clicking action
will constitute assent, then a finding of manifestation of mutual
assent is warranted.150
B. Benefits of a Presumption Against Assent
Adopting a presumption against assent is good for both policy
and practical reasons. There are two primary doctrinal and policy
reasons for government enforcement of contracts: protection of
individual rights and promotion of utilitarian goals.151 Individual
rights theories promote individual autonomy, self-governance, and
self-determination through contracting, whereas utilitarian theories
focus on the social benefits from contracting.152 First, the central
premise of an individual rights theory is that “contracts should
promulgate the intent of the parties and ensure the security of
transactions.” 153 However, without valid consent under the
individual rights theory, “judicial enforcement of contracts is state
terms apply, and the representation of terms is not directly adjacent to the ‘Place
your order’ button so as to indicate that a user should construe clicking as
acceptance.”); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20, 29–30 (2d
Cir. 2002) (“[C]licking on a . . . button does not communicate assent to
contractual terms if the offer did not make clear to the consumer that clicking on
the . . . button would signify assent to those terms.”).
149
Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *32 (quoting Schnabel v.
Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 127–28 (2d Cir. 2012) (“There is a real risk here
that Uber’s registration screen ‘made joining [Uber] fast and simple and made it
appear—falsely—that being a [user] imposed virtually no burdens on the
consumer besides payment.’”).
150
Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 840 (“Fteja was informed of the consequences of
his assenting click and he was shown, immediately below, where to click to
understand those consequences.”).
151
KIM, supra note 8, at 8–9.
152
Id. at 9–10.
153
Id. at 212.
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coercion.”154 Thus, as courts continue to validate wrap contracts
that stretch the definition of assent, they stretch the legitimacy of
contract law itself.155
Second, the idea that contracts serve a utilitarian purpose in a
market economy is premised on the condition that each party will
only enter into deals that benefit them and thereby benefit
society.156 However, if one party is ignorant of the agreement or,
similarly, if a party has no power to negotiate within a market, then
there is no structural guarantee that the agreements will, on the
whole, be net beneficial for society. 157 Widespread use of
constructive notice means that fewer consumers are genuinely
participating in the contracting process in a way that yields the
benefits envisioned by the individual rights and utilitarian
theories.158 While efficient wrap contracts are necessary in a fast
moving industrial and information economy,159 if courts allow the
law to stray too far from its doctrinal underpinnings, then these
wrap contracts will no longer be beneficial. 160 To protect
consumer’s individual rights and promote economic flourishing,
courts must ensure there is true mutual assent by adopting a
rebuttable presumption against assent in online contracting.

154

Id. at 211.
Id. at 194.
156
Id. at 29 (“Contracts are supposed to be economically efficient because the
parties are in the best position to assess the value of a particular good or
service—its ‘value.’ Parties are presumed to have entered into contracts after
assessing the risks and benefits of a transaction. Their objective is to maximize
the surplus that the deal can create.”).
157
Id. at 30.
158
Id. at 174–75.
159
Id. at 20–21. (“As mass market sales became possible with
industrialization, so did mass consumer form contracts . . . . Simplifying the
contracting process by discouraging or even preventing negotiations shortens the
time from transaction inception to completion. Given the impracticability of
negotiating, modifying, or even discussing contractual terms with each of their
consumers, companies found it much more convenient and efficient to create
standard terms for standard business transactions.”).
160
Id. at 211.
155

208

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 18: 180

A critique is that increasing the notice requirements will not
make more consumers read terms of use or really understand the
agreement that they are making.161 However, it does a better job of
notifying the consumer that they are making an agreement. Over
time, as courts require more assent, there will be more
opportunities for consumers and consumer advocates to effect
change.162 Another potential issue is that requiring more assent
places a larger burden on businesses and creates more friction in
commercial transactions.163 However, the policy requirements that
require clearer manifestations of mutual assent outweigh the
burdens on business. Browsewrap agreements are inefficient for
businesses because they run a high risk of being unenforceable.164
Additionally, the analysis of browsewrap agreements is more
difficult for courts than the relatively straightforward clickwrap
analysis. 165 Thus, businesses and courts would benefit from
increased certainty judicial efficiency.166 By requiring companies to
161

Preston, supra note 58, at 536.
But see Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print?
Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6, 32-33
(January 2014) (“[T]he primary cost facing consumers is in reading and
comprehending contract terms[.]”).
163
KIM, supra note 8, at 174–75; Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, The Licensing of
Intellectual Property: Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the
Recommendations of the ALI’s “principles of the Law of Software Contracts,”
78 U. CHI. L. REV 165, 167 (2011).
164
BREHM, supra note 27, at 4 (citing Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., No. 5:13CV-05682-LHK, 2014 WL 2903752, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014)
(“Generally, courts have declined to enforce browsewrap agreements because
the fundamental element of assent is lacking.”).
165
See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 238 (2d Cir. 2016)
(“While clickwrap agreements that display terms in a scrollbox and require users
to click an icon are not necessarily required, they are certainly the easiest
method of ensuring that terms are agreed to.”).
166
Additionally, if companies are required to overcome an initial
presumption, they will keep better records for evidence. For example, Facebook
clearly proved that a user had to agree to the terms when creating an account.
Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834–35 (S.D.N.Y 2012). On the
contrary, Amazon was unable to prove Nicosia had agreed to clickwrap terms
when creating his account, which could have resolved the issue much more
expediently. Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 235, 237–38; see also supra note 106.
162
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provide strong evidence of notice, businesses will have increased
confidence that their agreements will be enforceable, like
Facebook’s agreement,167 instead of unenforceable, like Uber’s168
and Amazon’s.169
As the general public accesses and utilizes new technology, the
definition of the reasonably prudent offeree must also change to
reflect new contract formation scenarios. As technological
developments continue to push consumers further away from
traditional consent models, establishing the presumption against
notice becomes even more critical. Consumers will be entering into
contracts via usage of the Internet of Things170 or by interacting
with companies in non-traditional contracting settings, such as
social media. 171 Overall, adopting a presumption against assent
better reflects present reality and better equips courts for future
changes.
C. Nicosia v. Amazon.com: Applying the Presumption against
Assent
Because the Second Circuit only vacated the motion to dismiss
and did not decide if there was a manifestation of mutual assent,
the district court must determine how to evaluate the facts on
remand.172 The district court should apply the presumption against
assent, as discussed above, and find that there was no
manifestation of mutual assent to the Amazon Conditions of Use.173
The court should focus on the web design and the Nicosia’s actions
167

Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 834–35.
Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *13–14
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016).
169
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 237.
170
See generally Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age of the Internet of
Things: Article 2 of the UCC and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839 (2016).
Internet of Things (“IOT”) is a generic phrase describing the growing number of
internet-connected consumer devices, ranging from smartphones to smart
thermostats.
171
See generally Canis, supra note 57.
172
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 237–40.
173
As of the writing of this Recent Development, the district court has not yet
ruled on remanded.
168
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to determine (1) if the notice was relatively conspicuous and (2)
whether Nicosia intended to assent by placing his order.
First, the district court should evaluate the conspicuousness of
notice of Conditions relative to the other elements the Amazon
purchase page to determine if the consumer’s experience would
have been disrupted. When Nicosia made his purchases in 2013,
the checkout screen contained a standard blue underlined hyperlink
to the Conditions of Use and a statement reading, “By placing your
order, you agree to Amazon.com’s Conditions of Use.” 174 The
hyperlink was located at the very bottom of the page and was set in
a smaller type then other test on the page.175 As noted by the
Second Circuit, the Amazon purchase page contained a myriad of
other colorful, prominent, attention-grabbing advertisements and
hyperlinks.176 Notably, the “Place your order” button was located in
an “Order Summary” box, which contained information directly to
the order being placed.177 However, while the Conditions of Use
directly relate to the sale, they are not located within this box.178
Instead, the Conditions of Use were placed as the bottom of the
page with hyperlinks to Amazon webpages.179
Based on these facts, the district court should hold that the
notice of the Conditions of Use was relatively not conspicuous. In
Meyer v. Kalanick, the court remarked that, based on the design of
the registration and the relative inconspicuousness of the notice,
the corporation likely hoped the consumer’s experience would not

174

Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2015);
Brief for Appellee at 7, 26, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220 (2d Cir.
2016); see also supra note 124.
175
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 236–37; Brief for Appellant at 22, Nicosia v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2016).
176
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 236–37.
177
Id. (“The Order Summary box lists the cost of the items to be purchased,
shipping and handling costs, total price before tax, estimated tax to be collected,
purchase total, gift card amount, and order total. The words ‘Order total’ appear
in bold, red font.”).
178
Id.
179
Id.
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be “disrupted” by the formal notice.180 Likewise, here, there are
many other advertisements and programs that Amazon is trying to
promote to the consumer, as demonstrated by the bold, colorful
advertisements. This contrasts sharply with the smaller text of the
notice, which strongly implies a de-emphasizing purpose.
Furthermore, the Conditions of Use should have been placed
within the “Order Summary” box with the rest of the relevant order
information. The proximity and logical topical grouping of order
related material to the “Place your order” button would have
placed the reasonably prudent offeree on constructive notice. But,
by segregating the Conditions of Use from the clearly labeled order
material, the website design misleads the consumer into
concluding all of the notices are in that box.181 Had Amazon made
the text the size of the average text on the page and placed the
notice within the “Order Summary” box, the notice would be
relatively conspicuous on the page and would overcome the first
element of the presumption assent. Since Amazon did not take this
approach, the district court should find the notice was not
relatively conspicuous and, thus, there is no manifestation of
mutual assent.
Second, if the district court were to find that Nicosia had
constructive notice of the Conditions of Use, Amazon would need
to overcome the presumption that Nicosia’s action of placing the
order did not constitute an intention to manifest assent. Because
the proposed mechanism for manifesting intent assent is also the
“Place your order” button, the district court must determine
whether Nicosia intended both to assent and place his order or just
simply to place his order. 182 In Specht, the court noted that
180

Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *31
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016).
181
Id. at *32 (quoting Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 127–28 (2d
Cir. 2012)) (“There is a real risk here that Uber’s registration screen ‘made
joining [Uber] fast and simple and made it appear—falsely—that being a [user]
imposed virtually no burdens on the consumer besides payment.’”).
182
Indeed, this is exactly what Nicosia argued to the Second Circuit. Reply
Brief for Appellant at 9, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220 (2d Cir.
2016) (“[C]licking ‘Place your order’ accomplishes only what it says. It does not
provide notice or form a valid agreement to arbitration using clickwrap.”).
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“clicking on a download button does not communicate assent to
contractual terms if the offer did not make clear to the consumer
that clicking on the button would signify assent to those terms.”183
Here, while clicking “Place your order” is not an inherently
equivalent manifestation of assent to clicking “I agree,” 184 the
language of the notice closely parallels the language on the button,
and thus the district court should find the presumption against
finding an intent to assent is overcome.185 In Facebook v. Fteja, the
court found the user knew his click would constitute assent due to
the close proximity and parallel language of the notice and the
pertinent button.186 Here, because the notice refers to “placing your
order” and the button is similarly labeled “Place your order,” the
reasonably prudent offeree would understand that clicking the
“Place your order” button would constitute assent.187
Overall, the district court should find that no binding contract
exists because the reasonably prudent offeree would not have
constructive notice of the Conditions of Use. Because the
Conditions of Use are relatively inconspicuous on the page, the
court cannot assume that the reasonably prudent consumer will be
aware of them at the time of purchase. Without constructive notice,
the consumer cannot have the knowledge that placing his order
constitutes assent.

183

Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 30–31 (2d Cir. 2002).
Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 236–37 (2d Cir. 2016).
185
This is still assuming the court had first found the presumption against
notice was overcome. See Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 121 (“As a general principle, an
offeree cannot actually assent to an offer unless the offeree knows of its
existence.”); see also supra Section III.C (explaining that simultaneously
evaluating notice and actions manifesting assent constitutes one of the major
problems with hybridwrap).
186
Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835, 840 (S.D.N.Y 2012)
(finding the intent to assent criteria was satisfied because the notice language
explicitly stated assent would be manifest “By clicking Sign Up” and the button
was labeled “Sign Up”).
187
Ideally, the notice would state, “by clicking place your order” in order to
be completely unambiguous. However, the language does not need to be
verbatim to satisfy the reasonably prudent offeree standard.
184
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VI. CONCLUSION
“[T]here is a genuine risk that a fundamental principle of
contract formation will be left in the dust: the requirement for a
manifestation of mutual assent . . . . But that would be too cynical
and hasty a view, and certainly not the law.”188 Because contract
law is predicated on manifestations of mutual assent, courts must
endeavor to faithfully protect and apply that doctrine. While it is
difficult for courts, consumers, and businesses alike to determine
how we should expect a reasonable consumer to act, the difficulty
alone is not a reason not to try. Overall, courts have little to gain
and much to lose from adding hybridwrap as a category of wrap
contracts. Instead of adopting the ill-advised hybridwrap
framework, courts should protect individuals from losing important
rights, especially when those individuals are simply engaging the
modern information economy. Moving forward, courts need to
figure out how to return manifestation of mutual assent to central
prominence in contract formation, and ascertain how it applies in
the “middle ground” cases. Adopting presumptions that favor
strong mutual assent requirements will not only protect consumers,
but also protect contracting in the 21st century.
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Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *34–35
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016).

